Barbara Grosz Distinguished Lecture in AI and Society 2026
Jon Kleinberg, AI's Models of the World, and Ours

Table of Contents

Placeholder. Facts below are from the Harvard SEAS listing and the published abstract; notes get written after the talk.

1. Facts

Field Value
Event 2026 Barbara Grosz Distinguished Lecture in AI and Society
Talk AI's Models of the World, and Ours
Speaker Jon Kleinberg, Tisch University Professor, Computer Science and Information Science, Cornell
Date <2026-09-10 Thu 14:30-15:30>
Venue Science and Engineering Complex (SEC), room LL2.224, Harvard SEAS
Series Computer Science Lecture Series
URL events.seas.harvard.edu

2. The argument

Generative models succeed on two levels at once: observable behaviour, and the internal representations of the world they build for their own use. The talk asks how those internal representations compare to the ones humans build, and what happens at the seam.

The practical stake is a failure mode rather than a capability gap. Where the system's model of the world and the person's model diverge, the system can "set us up to fail" through ordinary interaction — not by being wrong on its own terms, but by being right on terms the person does not share.

Worked examples named in the abstract:

  • Chess. A model trained to win, then paired with a weaker partner who makes some of the moves.
  • Navigation. A model trained to find shortest routes, then handed an unexpected detour.

And a theoretical result that sharpens the whole thing: successful generation is achievable by agents provably incapable of identifying the model they are generating from.

Joint work with Ashton Anderson, Karim Hamade, Reid McIlroy-Young, Siddhartha Sen, Justin Chen, Sendhil Mullainathan, Ashesh Rambachan, Keyon Vafa, Fan Wei, Chris Qiu, and Prabhakar Raghavan.

3. Why this one

The generation-without-identification result is the interesting half, and it lands near an argument already in the corpus. The shipping-the-model note works the same seam from the engineering side: a model that cannot disagree with the implementation it describes is not an instrument, because agreement is guaranteed and therefore uninformative. Kleinberg's version is stronger and stranger — an agent can generate competently from a model it could not identify if asked.

The chess-with-a-weaker-partner setup is also the human-in-the-loop case the attribution work kept running into from the other direction: two parties holding different states, and a system that resolves the difference silently rather than surfacing it.

4. Speaker

Kleinberg works on the interaction of algorithms and networks, their role in large-scale social and information systems, and the societal consequences. Member of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society. Served on the National AI Advisory Committee and the National Research Council's CSTB and CSTL. MacArthur, Packard, Simons, Sloan and Vannevar Bush fellowships; Nevanlinna Prize, World Laureates Association Prize, ACM/AAAI Allen Newell Award, ACM Prize in Computing.

5. Notes

To be written after the talk.

6. Links